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Prevention or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? Predictive Policing’s Erosion of the Presumption of
Innocence

Introduction
Eric Hanson, a fifty-eight year old retired firefighter, is stopped by San Diego police after
a dispute with a man he named a prowler.1 He is ordered to sit on the curb where officers then
use an iPad to take photographs of his face without his consent.2 Officers also use a cotton swab
to take Mr. Hanson’s DNA sample from the inside of his cheek, again without his consent, and
without any arrest having been made.3 Officers then run his photograph through facial
recognition software.4 Mr. Hanson has no criminal record.5 Nor does he have access to the
photograph that was taken of him.6 Neither man is arrested.7
Similar to something straight from the pages of 1984,8 police departments throughout the
United States have begun using technology to increase surveillance on citizens in the name of
crime prevention.9 Mr. Hanson’s story is just one scenario playing out under the use of predictive

1

Timothy Williams, Facial Recognition Software Moves From Overseas Wars to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/facial-recognition-software-moves-from-overseas-wars-to-localpolice.html?module=inline.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Timothy Williams, Facial Recognition Software Moves From Overseas Wars to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/facial-recognition-software-moves-from-overseas-wars-to-localpolice.html?module=inline.
7
Id.
8
1984 is a dystopian novel published in 1949 by English author George Orwell.
9
See Issie Lapowsky, How the LAPD Uses Data to Predict Crime, WIRED (May 22, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/los-angeles-police-department-predictive-policing/ (discussing predictive policing
programs in use by the Los Angeles Police Department); Ali Winston, Planatir Has Secretly Been Using New
Orleans to Test its Predictive Policing Technology, THE VERGE (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-orleans-nopd (discussing the
New Orleans Police Department’s use of predictive policing technology); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Police Are
Using Computer Algorithms to Tell if You’re a Threat, TIME (Oct. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4966125/policedepartments-algorithms-chicago/ (analyzing the Chicago Police Department’s use of algorithms in predictive
policing methods); Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Erica Posey, Public Deserves to Know How NYPD Uses
Predictive Policing Software, Brennan Center for Justice (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/courtrejects-nypd-attempts-shield-predictive-policing-disclosure (discussing litigation regarding the New York Police
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policing10 programs throughout America.11 In the case of Tyrone Brown, a twenty-nine year old
African American man on probation in Kansas City, Missouri, police surveillance looms
especially close.12 Unlike Mr. Hanson, Mr. Brown does have a criminal record, so when his
probation officer requested his presence at a community auditorium, he expected to be
admonished into helping end violence within the community.13 Instead, Mr. Brown was met with
his photograph on screen, included as part of a list of individuals local authorities were “cracking
down” on.14 He was linked to a criminal group that was implicated in a homicide.15 Mr. Brown’s
criminal record included only drug and assault charges, but this was enough to place him at the
center of the Kansas City No Violence Alliance16 program where local authorities turn to
algorithms17 to predict the individuals likely to be involved in future crime.18

Department’s use of predictive policing software); Kenneth Coats, The Future of Policing Using Pre-Crime
Technology, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/14/the-future-ofpolicing-using-pre-crime-technology/#2965424664a1 (examining Hartford, Connecticut’s use of pre-crime
technology to watch over citizens).
10
Predictive Policing, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (June 9, 2014), https://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/welcome.aspx (“Predictive policing tries to harness the power of
information, geospatial technologies and evidence-based intervention models to reduce crime and improve public
safety. This two-pronged approach – applying advanced analytics to various data sets, in conjunction with
intervention models – can move law enforcement from reacting to crimes into the realm of predicting what and
where something is likely to happen and deploying resources accordingly.”)
11
See also Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, This Teen’s Story is Your Worst Predictive Policing Nightmare, VOCATIV
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.vocativ.com/418541/predictive-policing-nightmare/index.html.
12
John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to Commit Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likelyto-commit-crimes.html.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Kansas City No Violence Alliance, http://kansascitynova.org/about.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) (“The Kansas
City No Violence Alliance (KC NoVA) is a community collaboration among several organizations committed to
reducing violent crime in the urban core.”)
17
Mikella Hurley, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 148, 159 (quoting THOMAS H.
CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSEN, RONALD L. RIVEST, & CLIFFORD STEIN, INTRODUCTION TO
ALGORITHMS 1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted)) (“An algorithm can be described as ‘any well-defined
computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and procedures some value, or set of
values, as an output. An algorithm is thus a sequence of computational steps that transforms the input into the
output.’”)
18
Supra, note 12.
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Police departments across the United States, including Los Angeles, Miami, and
Nashville, have begun to make use of federally funded computer models that forecast crime.19
These models look to predictive analytics20 and data mining21 to predict behavior.22 The
programs culminate in an approach termed “predictive policing” now in use in numerous
communities not only in the United States, but other countries as well.23 Predictive involves
using information, geospatial technologies, and evidence-based intervention models to reduce
crime and improve public safety.24 More specifically, departments using predictive policing
methods seek to apply advanced analytics to various data sets25 in conjunction with intervention
models.26 The goal is to transition law enforcement from reacting to crimes, to predicting what
and where crime is likely to occur, and positioning resources accordingly.27 However, the use of
these predictive methods has been found to chip away at a well-founded right in the United
States criminal justice system: the presumption of innocence.28

19

Id.
Larry Myler, The Next Frontier of B2B Sales is Predictive Analytics, FORBES, Jul. 14, 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymyler/2017/07/14/the-next-frontier-of-b2b-sales-is-predictiveanalytics/#14942f875913 (“Predictive analytics is the use of data, statistical algorithms and machine learning
techniques to identify the likelihood of future outcomes based on historical data.”)
21
Dictionary.com defines data mining as, “the process of collecting, searching through, and analyzing a large
amount of data in a database, as to discover patterns or relationships.” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/datamining (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
22
Supra, note 17.
23
See Alexander Babuta, et al., Machine Learning Algorithms and Police Decision-Making: Legal, Ethical, and
Regulatory Challenges, RUSI Whitehall Report 3-18, Sept. 2018, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201809_whr_318_machine_learning_algorithms.pdf.pdf (“In the UK, predictive policing algorithms have been in use for more than
ten years, to identify geospatial locations that are most at risk of experiencing crime and to then pre-emptively
deploy resources to where they are most needed – ‘predictive crime mapping.’”)
24
Predictive Policing, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, (June 9, 2014), https://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/welcome.aspx.
25
Dictionary.com defines a “data set” as, “a collection of data records for computer processing.”
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/data-set (last visited Nov. 11, 2018).
26
Id.
27
Id. (“Predictive policing leverages computer models – such as those used in the business industry to anticipate
how market conditions or industry trends will evolve over time – for law enforcement purposes, namely anticipating
likely crime events and informing actions to prevent crime.”)
28
Cf. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 (2012).
20

3

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”29 Out of this due process right
stems the accused’s right to be presumed innocent.30 While the presumption of innocence is not
specifically codified in United States law, both the Supreme Court and state courts have
solidified its place in the criminal justice system.31 In Coffin v. United States,32 the United States
Supreme Court held that “[t]he principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”33 Despite this unequivocal proclamation,
courts, law enforcement, and legislators alike, have failed to protect the presumption of
innocence in the face of developing police technology, specifically, predictive policing methods.
While many of the programs and strategies used are still in their infancy, the future of predictive
policing raises significant concerns regarding constitutional rights.34
This note discusses the effect of predictive policing strategies on the presumption of
innocence, particularly, its erosion of the same, and argues that legislation be adopted to monitor
and regulate said strategies. Part I gives an overview of the history of the presumption of
innocence with specific focus on its foundation and evolution in American law as well as the
process to initiate criminal proceedings against an individual. Part II will discuss the origins and
progression of predictive policing and examine the methodology behind strategies implemented
by U.S. police departments. Part III seeks to analyze the effect of predictive policing on the

29

U.S. CONST. AMEND. 5.
See also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
31
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895) (holding that a reasonable doubt instruction is not the equivalent of a
presumption of innocence instruction).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 453.
34
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259 (2012)
(“Predictive policing, like many new law enforcement strategies, raises issues of class-based and race-based
targeting, as well as general civil liberties concerns.”)
30
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presumption of innocence, analyzing first the departure from the reasonable suspicion standard,
its effects on minority communities, and causation issues stemming from the gap between data
and man-made decision-making. Part IV presents suggested solutions in the form of potential
legislation regulating the use of predictive policing.
I.

Background: The Origin and Evolution of the Presumption of Innocence in
American Jurisprudence
This Part provides background information discussing the origins and evolution of the

American criminal justice system paying specific attention to the development of the distinction
between the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard. It provides an
overview of the requirements to bring criminal charges against an individual and legal
foundations law enforcement must follow to make an arrest and pursue criminal charges.
A. History and Distinctions Between the Presumption of Innocence and the
Reasonable Doubt Standard
The origins of the presumption of innocence date far beyond even the founding of
America. The development of the adversarial system and jury trial in England paved the way for
a transition from crude medieval law to the systems and maxims in place in America today;35
“The evolution from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial system of justice reflected a
consensus that a number of fundamental interests and rights required that the burdens of
production and persuasion be shifted to the state.”36 This shifting of the burden from the accused
to demonstrate his innocence, to the state to produce evidence of the accused’s guilt, laid the
foundation for not only the reasonable doubt standard, but for the presumption of innocence as

35

See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 (1995).
Id. (“God could no longer reveal the innocent from the murderer, thief, and robber. Proof of factual innocence was
replaced by proof of legal guilt or in its absence, legal innocence.”)
36
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well. Early in America’s history, the Supreme Court reinforced the use of the adversarial system
in Rogers v. Richmond,37 wherein Justice Frankfurter proclaimed, “[O]urs is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system – a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused
out of his own mouth.”38
The evolution of the presumption of innocence also finds roots in the United States
Constitution being that courts have used the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to interpret as
granting certain pretrial rights.39 Out of this Amendment stems the reasonable doubt standard and
the presumption of innocence. However, not until Coffin, did a distinction exist between the
two.40 In Coffin, the Supreme Court considered, as an original question, the distinction between
the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence.41 The Court determined that the
“presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his
innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the
law has created.”42 The Court goes on to juxtapose the reasonable doubt standard from the
presumption of innocence, defining reasonable doubt as “the result of the proof, not the proof
itself; whereas the presumption of innocence is one of the instruments of proof, going to bring
about the proof, from which reasonable doubt arises….”43 The Coffin Court essentially separated
the two principles, further defining the presumption of innocence as a fundamental principle and

37

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Id. at 541.
39
U.S. CONST. AMEND. 5; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime he is charged with); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
40
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
41
Id. at 458.
42
Id. at 459.
43
Id. at 460.
38
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legal burden separate from the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.44 Both
of these standards have been held to apply regardless of the factual guilt or innocence of the
accused.45
The distinction cemented in Coffin has been further interpreted to grant the accused the
right to be presumed innocent throughout trial up and until the prosecution meets its burden
beyond a reasonable doubt.46 The Supreme Court confirmed this in Taylor v. Kentucky, where it
held that “one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on
the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment,
continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.”47 While the Supreme
Court later ruled that an instruction on the presumption of innocence is not constitutionally
required in every criminal case, it still requires an evaluation in light of the totality of the
circumstances to ensure the defendant receives a constitutionally fair trial. 48 Despite the
requirements laid out in Taylor v. Kentucky, police departments throughout the country have
increased their use of predictive policing measures to determine guilt, innocence, and propensity
far before trial and without the Constitutional safeguards underlying the reasonable doubt
standard.
B. Traditional Constitutional Requirements for Police Intervention and Arrest

44

Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 736 (2011).
United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming the proposition that the presumption of innocence
and beyond a reasonable doubt standard apply to all criminal defendants without regard to their actual guilt or
innocence).
46
See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to give petitioner’s requested
instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause).
47
Id. at 485.
48
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (“The court’s inquiry should have been directed to a
determination of whether the failure to give such an instruction in the present case deprived the respondent of due
process of law in light of the totality of the circumstances.”)
45
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, further stating that no warrants shall be issued but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.49 The Supreme Court has interpreted
seizure of persons to occur only when a reasonable person would feel that he or she was not free
to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter under a totality of the
circumstances analysis.50 Additionally, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
require either a physical application of force by the officer or a submission to the officer’s show
of force.51
In order to make an arrest, an officer must have probable cause.52 Probable cause to arrest
is present when, at the time of arrest, the officer has within his or her knowledge reasonably
trustworthy facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe
the suspect has committed or is committing a crime for which arrest is authorized by law.53 The
warrant requirement listed in the Fourth Amendment is waived when officers attempt to arrest
someone in a public place, even if they have time to obtain an arrest warrant.54 The Supreme
Court has granted officers vast discretion in this regard, being that police may make a
warrantless misdemeanor arrest even if the crime for which the arrest is made cannot be
punished by incarceration.55 Even more troubling is the fact that an unlawful arrest by itself has
no impact on a subsequent criminal prosecution; if police improperly arrest someone, they can

49

U.S. CONST. AMEND. 4.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
51
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (stating that it is not enough that the officer merely ordered the
person to stop to constitute a seizure of persons).
52
U.S. CONST. AMEND. 4.
53
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 336 U.S. 160, 176 (“The rule of probable cause
is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating . . .
often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. Tow allow less would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.”)
54
U.S. CONST. AMEND. 4; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
55
See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
50
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detain them if they have probable cause to do so and the invalid arrest is not a defense to the
offense charged.56
More particular to predictive policing efforts are investigatory detentions which stray
even further from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.57 Landmark case Terry v.
Ohio58allows law enforcement to briefly detain a person for investigative purposes even if they
lack the probable cause necessary to make an arrest.59 Terry stops merely require police have
reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts of criminal activity or involvement in a
completed crime.60 Courts do not specifically define “reasonable suspicion,” only stating that it
requires more than a vague suspicion judged under the totality of the circumstances.61 Further, if
police have reasonable suspicion to believe the detainee is armed and dangerous, they can also
conduct a frisk to ensure the detainee has no weapons.62 Reasonable suspicion, not unlike
probable cause, need not arise from the police officer’s personal knowledge.63 Investigatory
stops are not limited to a specified time limit, the only requirement being that police must act in a
diligent and reasonable manner in confirming or dispelling their suspicions.64 The development
of predictive policing technologies has raised questions regarding the sources of probable cause
and reasonable suspicion to be analyzed later on in Part III of this paper.
II.

Predictive Policing: Methodology and History
This section provides a cursory overview of the use of predictive software in policing. It

begins by briefly defining the terms and methods underlying predictive policing. It examines the

56

See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
U.S. CONST. AMEND. 4.
58
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
62
Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
63
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
64
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
57
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transition from older methods to current, more advanced technologies, further examining some
of the drawbacks to these methods. It places particular focus on transparency and accuracy issues
presented by use of this type of technology.
A. The Underlying Methodology of Predictive Policing
To better understand the perils of predictive policing, the inner mechanisms of algorithms
and machine learning must briefly be explored and further defined. Algorithms make use of
machine learning to create their predictions. Machine learning describes “a set of methods that
can automatically detect patterns in data, and then use the uncovered patterns to predict future
data, or to perform other kinds of decision making under uncertainty. An algorithm is thus a
sequence of computational steps that transforms the input into the output.”65 In other words,
algorithms are mathematical computations that take in certain data, analyze patterns within that
data, and use them to make predictions on future data based on those patterns.66
B. The Transitional History of Predictive Policing Methods
Predictive Policing in its current form is a fairly recent development in the American
criminal justice system.67 Previously, predictive software and methodology had primarily been
used by American military and intelligence agencies.68 Military agencies used facial recognition

65

Mikella Hurley, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 148, 159 (quoting THOMAS H.
CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSEN, RONALD L. RIVEST, & CLIFFORD STEIN, INTRODUCTION TO
ALGORITHMS 1 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted)).
66
Id.
67
WALTER L. PERRY, ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, PREDICTIVE POLICING 4 (2013) (“Police Chief (ret.) William J.
Bratton and the LAPD are credited with envisioning the predictive policing model. By 2008, Chief Bratton had
spoken widely in the public arena about the successes of the LAPD, including the department’s recent introduction
of predictive analytics to anticipate gang violence and to support real-time crime monitoring.”)
68
See Timothy Williams, Facial Recognition Software Moves From Overseas Wars to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/facial-recognition-software-moves-from-overseas-wars-tolocal-police.html?module=inline; see also Alex Campolo, et al., AI Now 2017 Report,
https://assets.ctfassets.net/8wprhhvnpfc0/1A9c3ZTCZa2KEYM64Wsc2a/8636557c5fb14f2b74b2be64c3ce0c78/_A
I_Now_Institute_2017_Report_.pdf (The United States military has been one of the most influential institutions
making use of artificial intelligence, its capabilities largely suited to military goals and objectives).
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software in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify potential terrorists.69 This same technology is now
being used by police departments around the United States to pursue conventional criminal
suspects.70 Some of the origins of predictive policing can also be found in crime mapping. A
study done by the University of Chicago in the 1930’s concluded that crime was positively
correlated with economically disadvantaged areas and demonstrated a link between delinquency
rates and “features of community structure like economic status, stability, and racial
composition.”71 This study formed the catalyst for the development of new theories of crime
such as Social Disorganization Theory,72 Routine Activities Theory,73 and Defensible Space
Theory,74 some of which are still considered today.75
Currently, predictive methods are an underlying part of everyday American life from
police-worn body cameras to ever-present surveillance footage.76 Facial recognition, using
algorithms to match facial features via photos and video, is used in various ways, from tagging

69

Id.
Id.
71
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 179 (quoting Ralph B. Taylor, Crime and Small-Scale Places: What we Know, What We Can
Prevent, and What Else We Need to Know, in Crime and Place: Plenary Papers of the 1997 Conference on Criminal
Justice Research and Evaluation 1, 14 (1998)).
72
Andres F. Rengifo, SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0008.xml (2017) (“Social disorganization is a theoretical perspective that
explains ecological differences in levels of crime based on structural and cultural factors shaping the nature of the
social order across communities.”)
73
Per-Olof H. Wilkstrom, ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORIES, (2018),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0010.xml (“[T]he
structure of routine activities in a society influences what kind of situations emerge, and changes in a society’s
routine activities cause changes in the kind of situations people confront… Routine activity theory links a macrolevel structural model with a micro-level situational model that aims to explain why a crime occurs.”)
74
Graham Steventon, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A CRIME
PREVENTION STRATEGY, (2010) (“Defensible space is a principle of crime prevention…Through enclavization, for
instance cul de sac layouts, the intention is to create exclusive living environments, which will precipitate
territoriality and a sense of community in residents, resulting in collective action against crime.”)
75
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 179.
76
See Amanda Ripley, A Big Test of Police Body Cameras Defies Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/upshot/a-big-test-of-police-body-cameras-defies-expectations.html (“By
2015, 95% of large police departments reported they were using body cameras or had committed to doing so in the
near future….”)
70
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friends in photos on Facebook, to unlocking cellphones, and soon to admit fans to Major League
Baseball games.77 More traditionally, facial recognition technology has also been used by law
enforcement agencies to compare photos or video stills to databases of license photographs or
mugshots to identify suspects.78 This technology has developed into the use of “real-time” facial
recognition where law enforcement is able to scan live video feeds constantly to match moving
faces with a database of still images.79 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has numerous
programs implementing facial recognition software: the FBI’s Next Generation Identification
system (NGI), in use since 2011, and Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation Services Unit
(FACE) to name a few.80 Instead of using biological or anatomical models of faces, these
programs use pattern matching approaches chosen by developers.81 Programs like NGI have
started to replace more traditional identification methods such as AFIS, the legacy Automated
Fingerprint Identification System.82 While advances in policing techniques have provided some
societal benefits, they have also created a system of structural surveillance that has been
advanced by military level technology.83
Police departments using predictive policing methods are relying on a new source: big
data.84 Police departments engaged in predictive policing use data mining to find correlations

Jon Schuppe, Facial Recognition Gives Police a Powerful New Tracking Tool. It’s Also Raising Alarms, NBC
NEWS (July 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/facial-recognition-gives-police-powerful-newtracking-tool-it-s-n894936.
78
Id. Maryland’s system was used to identify the suspect who allegedly massacred journalists at the Capital Gazette
newspaper in Annapolis and monitor protestors following the death of Freddie Gray in 2015 in Baltimore.
79
Id.
80
Kimberly J. Del Greco, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division FBI, Statement
Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 22, 2017,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/law-enforcements-use-of-facial-recognition-technology.
81
Id.
82
Next Generation Identification (NGI), FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi.
83
Jeffrey L. Vagle, Tightening the Ooda Loop: Police Militarization, Race, and Algorithmic Surveillance, 22 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 101, 102.
84
Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1920-21 (2013) (“’Big data’ is a configuration of
information-processing hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities of data in very short
77
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between various input data and criminal outcomes, oftentimes using variables like crime
locations and social networks.85 Put more simply, predictive algorithms sift through personal
information to make projections about an individual’s likely actions or risks.86
Large technology firms that create these types of programs have become one of the
biggest sources of these algorithms and the government has become the biggest customer.87
Departments like the New York Police Department have partnered with companies like Palantir
Technologies, a data analytics firm that works with intelligence agencies and police departments
nationwide.88 Through this relationship, Palantir received arrest records, license plate numbers,
and parking tickets to trace connections between people and crimes.89 Symbiotic relationships
between tech companies and law enforcement agencies are not unique in the growing world of
predictive policing.90 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has expanded its use of
technology, using tools like Investigative Case Management (ICM), which allows agents to
access previously separate databases holding information on a suspect’s schooling, employment
information, phone records, family relationships, foreign exchange program status, personal
connections, biometric traits, criminal history, and home and work addresses through another

times… The process involves mining the data for patterns, distilling the patterns into predictive analytics, and
applying the analytics to new data.”)
85
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113.
86
Danielle Keats Citron, Artificial Intelligence and the Law: Essay: The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4.
87
See Angel Diaz & Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hold Private Police Partners Accountable, Too, Brennan Center
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Palantir system.91 Additionally, large companies like Amazon and Axon (the country’s largest
supplier of police body cameras) have become targeted by civil liberties unions throughout the
country because of their marketing to American law enforcement.92 Amazon was criticized by
the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California who revealed the company’s efforts
to sell facial recognition software to American police forces, including using officers to scan live
feeds from surveillance cameras and determine whether those images matched photos in a
database of missing or wanted people.93
One of the programs at the very foundation of predictive policing is PredPol, a program
created by UCLA scientists in coordination with the Los Angeles Police Department to see how
scientific analysis of crime data could help spot patterns of criminal behavior.94 This place-based
prediction system relies on historical crime data in conjunction with near-repeat theory, which
hypothesizes that certain crimes occur in close temporal and spatial windows to where they have
already occurred.95 PredPol is used in over sixty police departments throughout the United States
to identify areas in a neighborhood where serious crimes are more likely to occur during a
particular period.96 PredPol limits its predictions to location whereas other programs take the
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next step in predicting who is likely to commit crime, an approach used by Chicago police
departments.97 In Chicago, police departments make use of a “Strategic Subject List”98 which
includes individuals most likely to be involved in future shootings, either as victim or shooter.99
Factors considered in creating this list include criminal record, social circles, and gang
connections, as well as whether one has been the victim of an assault or a shooting.100 An
individual’s personalized threat score appears on police dashboard computers when making a
stop.101 This score also determines who gets targeted for proactive police intervention, such
interventions ranging from home visits from police officers, to added police surveillance, to an
invitation to a community meeting.102 High risk individuals are prioritized using an algorithm
that analyzes past arrests for violent crime, weapons or narcotics offenses, age, incidents where
the individual was a victim of a shooting or assault, and the trend line of criminal activity.103
Also included in this strategy are elements of traditional policing with increased attention to
crime “hot spots” and close monitoring of recent parolees.104 However, more nontraditional data
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is also used including friendships, social media activity, and drug use in adding individuals to the
list and assisting authorities in forecasting crime.105
Transparency behind these methods varies.106 While programs similar to Chicago’s are
taking place around the country, “civil liberties groups question the legality and efficacy of such
programs, saying citizens, besides having the right to a presumption of innocence, should be able
to know exactly how they wind up on a list, and should be able to challenge their inclusion.”107
Another challenge with programs of this nature is the level of accuracy.108 Programs like
facial recognition have advanced from machine learning based on comparisons of certain facial
features to “neural networks” that take a more holistic view of faces, thereby improving their
accuracy.109 Accuracy depends on the data used to teach the algorithm, and therein lies another
potential issue with the program: these programs require a broad database of faces and
conditions, people with varied skin tones captured at various angles, distances, and lighting, to
enable the algorithm to produce a more accurate prediction.110 These technical blind spots open
the door to false identifications and improper predictions that can cause innocent people to
become entangled in the criminal justice system, which will be discussed in further detail in the
next section.
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III.

Predictive Policing’s Effect on the Presumption of Innocence
Alongside the benefits, the pitfalls of predictive policing come in many shapes and forms.

This section seeks to analyze them starting with the departure from the reasonable suspicion
standard, discriminatory effects on minority communities, and causation issues caused by the gap
between computer-driven data and man-made decision-making.
A. Effects on Minority Communities
Predictive policing efforts lead to increased police presence in areas already facing high
rates of police surveillance.111 Algorithms used in these programs target poor and minority
communities despite attempts to use and provide objective data.112 Additionally, bias is woven
into the very fabric of these technologies through tainted input data.113 “Algorithmic policing
threatens black and brown communities already saturated with other kinds of police surveillance
technologies.”114 Threat scores like the ones in place in Chicago impact the way police interact
with individuals on the street.115 Once police have declared an individual above a certain threat
score, this knowledge changes how police interact with them; this knowledge leads to an
increase in perceived danger, resulting in more frequent and aggressive interactions with
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individuals the algorithm deems high risk.116 Risk assessment scores are particularly problematic
with regard to the presumption of innocence because they assess the likelihood that a particular
individual will commit another crime in the future.117 Another issue is that these scores do not
affect all races equally.118 A report by ProPublica,119 found that a popular software “was
particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this
way at almost twice the rate as white defendants,” and routinely “mislabeled [white defendants]
as low risk more often than black defendants.”120 These risk assessment scores again find
themselves based in flawed data sets rather than individualized suspicion.121 Once a person has
been deemed high risk, their presumption of innocence is effectively nonexistent.122 Instead of a
police interaction based on observed suspicious behavior, these individuals can be approached by
police for doing nothing at all other than appearing on a list they know nothing about and have
no power to change.
Algorithms used in predictive policing base their predictions on input data.123 The way
these algorithms function leaves room for human bias to become entangled in the predictions
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they create.124 Input, or training data, is often labeled by human hands, thereby incorporating
human bias and cultural assumptions.125 This phenomena is known as, “selection bias,” where
errors in estimation result when some members of a population are more likely to be sampled
than others.126 For example, when a machine learning program is trained to recognize faces of
one particular racial group and is then applied to a larger, more diverse population group, it may
produce biased results with a lower measure of accuracy.127 Additionally, crimes recorded by
police departments are not a complete census of all crimes committed due to nonreporting; nor
are they a wholly representative random sample.128 Being that data-driven programs are still
relatively new to policing, it can be difficult to obtain diverse data. Data is also expensive to
acquire, which leads algorithm developers to make use of data that is easy to obtain regardless of
its diversity.129 This can easily lead to skewed data because it can come from saturated sources,
where data is collected extensively from one group and not another.130 “[E]ven algorithms used
to predict the location of crime will only be as good as the information that is fed into them. If an
algorithm is populated primarily with crimes committed by black people, it will spit out results
that send police to black neighborhoods.”131 Because people of color are already
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disproportionately represented in America’s criminal justice system, and are stopped, detained,
arrested, and incarcerated at higher levels than whites, regardless of crime rates, predictive
policing algorithms require close monitoring.132 Researchers Kristian Lum and William Isaac of
the Human Rights Data Analysis Group published a case study analyzing a predictive policing
algorithm’s projected effects if applied in Oakland, California to police drug crime.133 The study
found that “the police data appear to disproportionately represent crimes committed in areas with
higher populations of non-white and low-income residents.”134 Results like these illuminate the
nature of policing in these neighborhoods. The logical conclusion is not farfetched: once you
find yourself present in a low-income minority neighborhood, your likelihood of being arrested
or detained by police increases.
The accuracy of programs like facial recognition also disfavor minorities.135 Research
from the Georgetown Law School estimated that 117 million American adults are present in
facial recognition networks in use by law enforcement and that African Americans were most
likely to be singled out due to their disproportionate representation in mug-shot databases.136
Facial recognition technology has varying rates of error depending on race and gender.137 This
again speaks to the issue of data set inclusion being that one widely used facial recognition data
set was assessed to be seventy-five percent male and over eighty percent white.138 This presents a
problem because algorithms are only as good as the data they use, so if there are more white
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people than black in the system, it will be worse at identifying black people.139 If police
departments then implement these algorithms, they are accepting and perpetuating the bias and
discrimination present in the predictive programming.140 Arrests are then being made based on
faulty information and without the resources to combat these false allegations, innocent people
will be placed in the criminal justice system with little to no recourse.141 Instead, systems police
departments intend to use should be publicly audited and monitored on an ongoing basis to
oversee their disparate impact on minority communities with results broken down by race and
neighborhood to better address disparities.142
B. Causation Issues: Data v. Man-made Decision-Making
Predictive policing methods bring about causation issues. If additional officers are
dispatched to the same locations consistently then it follows they will witness and report more
crime, resulting in higher arrest rates. But correlation is not causation. The mere presence of
additional officers skews the data in that it begs the question, is more crime being committed in
these areas or is more crime being reported in these areas due to increased police presence?
“Predictive policing thus raises some profound questions about the nature of prediction in an era
influenced by data collection and analysis.”143 These theories are based in the belief that certain
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aspects of physical and social environment encourage acts of criminal wrongdoing that can be
predicted and prevented.144 Predictive policing hypothesizes that interfering with those elements
of environment will deter crime.145 Despite these intentions, predictive policing effectively
amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy wherein police resources are disbursed to the same areas,
already labeled “high crime” to surveil people that have already had contact with the criminal
justice system. “Suspicion based on correlation may be acceptable when talking about placebased crimes, but it is insufficient when talking about person-based crimes. Sending a police car
to patrol a suspected area is less consequential than sending a police detective to interrogate a
suspect.”146 These methods have been used to justify violent crime-focused or person-focused
technology without the equivalent empirical testing to support it.147
This lack of testing contributes to a lack of transparency surrounding predictive policing
around the country.148 Companies providing police departments with the programs they use
attempt to prevent the inner workings of their products from becoming public knowledge
through claims of trade secrecy or business confidentiality.149 Instead, departments put these
programs in place with little, if any, public input and very little disclosure.150 Because officers
using the technology may be unable to explain how it works and companies creating the
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technology refuse to do so, the accused stands unable to articulate how or why the police
department erred, thereby giving an undeserved upper hand to law enforcement.
C. Departure from the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
The presumption of innocence has long been deemed a foundational principle in
American law.151 Despite this designation, American courts have been nearly silent in the face of
advancing technology that chips away at the presumption of innocence and relies less and less on
human decision-making. The traditional system of checks and balances in place since the
founding of America stands at risk of being set aside in favor of predictive technologies.
Computer-driven hunches or predictions should not be an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonable suspicion.152 Predictive policing programs that rely on algorithms to
predict who is likely to commit crime detract from the reasonable suspicion requirement. “It
undermines the constitutional requirement that police should target people based upon an
individual suspicion of wrongdoing, not statistical probability.”153 Instead of relying on
articulable facts, as required by the Supreme Court, police departments can point to vague
algorithmic outcomes that they are unlikely to be able to explain.154 Generally, police develop
reasonable suspicion from activities they observe or information they have been given.155 This is
individualized suspicion based on the perceived actions the individual has taken, not an
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algorithm based on previous conduct.156 Conventional reasonable suspicion is said to be based on
“small data,” discrete facts, limited information, and little knowledge about the actual suspect.157
Small data is traditionally thought of as solving discrete questions with limited structured data
generally controlled by one institution.158 Predictive policing seeks to expand this notion to big
data suspicion by basing reasonable suspicion on a vast network of information sources provided
by big data technology.159 While it has been established that reasonable suspicion need not arise
from the arresting officer’s personal knowledge, the source should be more than mere
speculation based on an individual’s past crimes and propensity to commit another.160 In many
other areas of law, the use of propensity is barred.161 Evidence of a crime or wrongdoing is not
admissible at trial to prove a defendant’s character to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with that character.162 This propensity evidence is exactly what
predictive policing seeks to use to supposedly predict and prevent crime. It effectively uses an
individual’s past behavior to predict how they will act and what crimes they will commit in the
future.163 While other portions of our criminal justice system take into consideration past
conduct, bail and sentencing for example, predictive policing must draw the line in the sand.164
Arrests should not be made solely on predictions that cause certain individuals to be under
increased law enforcement surveillance. These things require, and our Constitution requires,
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observed conduct; an arrest must typically be based on a warrant that requires probable cause.165
Predictive policing programs seek to satisfy the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
requirements by allowing law enforcement to rely on oftentimes flawed algorithmic data. If
safeguards are not implemented, then innocent people and people that have only committed
crimes in the past, will be under constant police surveillance based only on the predictions of a
computer rather than any actual conduct the individual has engaged in.
IV.

Suggested Solutions
The progression of technology provides opportunities for advancement within many

aspects of life. Predictive policing could be considered the next step in policing for departments
around the world. It is nearly counterintuitive to suggest that such agencies refuse to even
consider it. Technological advancements are an unavoidable component of a developing
society.166 That being said, the idea is not to prevent police departments from using this
technology, but to regulate it in the name of protecting the civil rights of the accused and the
innocent.
First, it bears mention that in addition to traditional and predictive policing methods,
social services can be used to address problems with at-risk individuals and communities before
crimes take place.167 Communities making use of this technology should consider using it to
determine where to allocate not only police officer presence, but social resources more generally
to provide things like educational opportunities, health services, and job training.168 This type of
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community policing constitutes a more holistic approach that touches the actual root of the
problem instead of attributing all crime to an offender.
Second, issues of transparency and accountability must be addressed.169 Predictive
policing programs must be regulated to standardize procedures across the nation and monitor
departments’ and companies’ use of predictive technology. This regulation may best be found in
the form of legislation. First, police departments using predictive policing technologies must
make this public record. Transparency is key to maintaining a just system that protects the rights
of the accused, including those that have only been predicted to be accused. Such efforts have
already been undertaken by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of
Law.170 The Brennan Center undertook litigation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law to
force the New York Police Department to disclose certain methods of predictive policing.171 The
litigation was successful in that it forced court action on the issue, which then ruled that the
agency bears the burden of demonstrating that the material sought is exempt from disclosure. 172
The court went on to require an in camera inspection of documents if the court cannot determine
whether they fall entirely within the scope of the asserted exemption.173 The court also
articulated several factors to determine whether information constitutes a trade secret: the extent
to which the information is known outside the business of the party seeking to keep it
confidential; the extent the information is known by employees in the business; the extent of
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measures taken to guard the information; the value of the information to the party and its
competitors; the amount of effort and funds expended in developing the information; and the
ease or difficulty in acquiring or duplicating the information by others.174 Courts throughout the
country should follow New York’s lead in placing guidelines and giving instructions to police
departments using these methods. Such rulings set the transparency parameters for what police
departments can and cannot avoid disclosing to the public.
Next, due process mechanisms must be put into place for those affected by predictive
policing tactics. If the name of an individual appears on a Strategic Subject List, that individual
should have the ability to take advantage of a procedure to dispute that finding. Review by a
judge of prior record, current status, and rehabilitative efforts contrasted by the predictive data
supplied and used by the police department is one possible first step. While some may argue that
this kind of procedural remedy will further slow down the courts and is not a constitutional
guarantee, this is not the case. Being that the right to be presumed innocent exists, those standing
accused of crimes should have the recourse to be made aware of and face their accuser. This
confrontation will also form a check on the system that searches for any discrimination or
disparities within the system. The aforementioned concepts are accountability measures that
place the burden on the police agency using the technology to be held accountable for the way
they use it. This also prevents the arbitrary use of police data in a way that violates the
constitutional rights of the accused. Transparency and procedural due process measures will help
ensure that constitutional protections are enforced, and personal data is being used properly and
efficiently.
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Accountability must also be shared with the technology companies that are providing the
algorithms and programs police departments use to restrain suspects’ liberty. Tech companies
should not be able to hide behind supposed trade secrets when it causes police departments to be
unable to articulate or defend their methodology, something that becomes imperative when an
arrest is questioned in court. Accountability in this sense may take the form of requiring tech
companies to disclose the algorithms used in programs they license to police departments they
know will be using them for the administration of justice.
Conclusion
Developing predictive policing technology continues to erode the accused’s right to be
presumed innocent. The lack of transparency from police departments leads to the arbitrary use
of these systems and the absence of accountability methods on artificial intelligence models
leaves criminal defendants with little recourse against improper arrests based on predictive data.
Despite the constitutional pitfalls of many predictive policing methods, they are most likely here
to stay. The argument lies not in the eradication of such methods, but in their regulation.
Therefore, legislation needs to be implemented that will require transparency and accountability
from police departments using this technology so that the presumption of innocence is not
completely eroded.
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